This paper presents a data fusion distributed algorithm for situation awareness in critical infrastructures with link failures based on the Transferable Belief Model (TBM). As a case study we consider a class of critical infrastructures exchanging the possible causes of faults or threats affecting those systems.
Usually, critical infrastructure systems combine the information coming from their sensors individually, without sharing any information regarding the state of their functioning with other infrastructures. This originates from the fact that the delivery of sensitive information to third-parties infrastructures can be a security issue, and this has been investigated in several research initiatives [1, 2] .
However, the lack of knowledge-sharing on disaster mitigation procedures has been considered as one of the major causes behind the disastrous post-tsunami recovery plans [3] .
In order to facilitate information sharing efforts in Critical infrastructure protection, in the US, the Department of Homeland Security has encouraged network topology to become stable, i.e., nodes and links are fixed and each agent does not perform any dynamic observation, in order to reach convergence.
Considerable research has been conducted to apply data fusion techniques to enhance the security of critical infrastructures. Flammini et al. [8] proposed 40 a theoretical centralized framework for correlating events detected by a wireless sensor network in the context of critical infrastructure protection. They developed a decision support system for early warning system to be used to face security threats by collecting data from heterogeneous sources in order to improve the protection of critical infrastructures. 45 Genge et al. [9] considered the concept of cyber-physical data fusion using the Dempster-Shafer theory to combine knowledge from the cyber and physical dimension of critical infrastructures in order to implement an anomaly detection system able to detect possible threats in a centralised fashion. The system was validated in a scenario evaluating the consequences of Distributed Denial of 50 Service (DDoS) attacks on the information network and the propagation of such disturbances to the operation of a simulated power grid.
Timoen et al. [10] proposed a platform that performs situational awareness of critical Infrastructures by combining an agent-based brokered architecture and Joint Directors of Laboratories (JDL) data fusion model. In this platform, 55 software agents produce events from different source systems and the brokered architecture allows the agents and multiple analysis components to collaborate.
The current state of the infrastructure can be determined by combining and analyzing event streams.
However, generally speaking the centralized nature of these approaches, i.e., 60 all data must be collected by a single node performing the aggregation, renders these approaches not robust against node's failures.
Oliva et al. [11] presented a distributed consensus algorithm based on fuzzy numbers and applied to a case study related to crisis management for critical infrastructures. The algorithm provides consensus on the overall criticality of In this work, we advance the state of the art by releasing the typical assumption of static network topology to accommodate for a scenario where link failures may occur due to natural disasters, cyber attacks or physical-security threats.
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In particular, we present a distributed data aggregation algorithm for situation awareness in critical infrastructures where the network topology describing the communication later, is unknown and may vary over time. Convergence is reached in finite time, without relying on a stable network topology, and using the cautious rule of combination [13] as the aggregation rule. This operator 85 does not require the information sources to be independent or distinct and thus is preferable compared to other ones, e.g., the TBM conjunctive and Dempster rules [14, 15] , which, instead, lack robustness when equal information are combined several times. Considering that the cautious rule of combination is appropriate when all sources are considered reliable, we define the convergence 90 response when all sources are non-distinct and reliable.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm, we consider as a case study several interconnected critical infrastructures subjected to physical failures, exhibiting functional dependencies. This challenging scenario demands for a novel distributed data fusion framework which can reduce the risk of This work is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce basic notions on Dempster-Shafer theory (DST) and recall the combination rules used in our algorithm. In Section 3, we present the main result of the paper. In Section 4, we present an application of our algorithm to a scenario of critical infrastruc-100 tures, that need to exchange information in distributed fashion to increase their security. Finally, in Section 5, some conclusions and ideas for future works are drawn.
Preliminaries
The theory of evidence is a formalism which can be used for modeling im-105 precision and uncertainty instead of classical probability. This theory, introduced by Dempster [16] and Shafer [15] (also known as Dempster-Shafer theory), embraces the intuitive idea of associating a number between zero and one to model the degree of confidence for a proposition from partial (uncertain, imprecise) evidence. Let Ω = {ω 1 , ..., ω n } be a finite set of possible values of a 110 variable ω, where the elements ω i are assumed to be mutually exclusive. Let
.., γ |Γ| } be the power set associated to it. In this framework, the interest is focused on quantifying the confidence of propositions of the form:
"The true value of ω is in γ," with γ ∈ 2 Ω . The set Ω, so defined, is referred to as frame of discernment. defined as:
Thus, for γ a ∈ 2 Ω , m(γ a ) is the part of confidence that supports exactly γ a 120 i.e., the fact that the true value of ω is in γ a but, due to the lack of further information, does not support any strict subset of γ a .
The limitation of the Dempster-Shafer formulation regards the application of the Dempster combination rule [15] , that produces counterintuitive results whenever there is a strong conflict among the sources to be combined [17] . A different approach is based on the Transferable Belief Model (TBM) defined by Smets [18] , which relies on the concept of BBA but removes the assumption of m(∅) = 0. The removal of this assumption applies when the frame of reference is not exhaustive, so that it is reasonable to believe that another event, not modeled in the considered frame, will occur. This allows to define a more refined 130 rule, the TBM conjunctive rule [14] , that is more robust than the Dempster combination rule, in the presence of conflicting evidence.
Definition 2 (TBM conjunctive rule ⊗). In the TBM, the combination rule removes the normalization constant in the Dempster combination rule and therefore is defined as follows:
The TBM conjunctive rule is associative and its use is appropriate when the conflict is related to poor reliability of some of the sources. However, such a rule, together with the Dempster combination rule, relies on the distinctness assumption of the sources or, in other words, that the information sources be independent. This limitation can be avoided using a combination rule that 140 observes the idempotence property. Denoeux [13] defines an associative, commutative and idempotent operator, called cautious rule of combination, that is appropriate when all sources are considered reliable and does not require the assumption of independence.
Definition 3 (Weight function). Let m be a generic BBA, the weight function
, otherwise, Definition 4 (Cautious rule of combination ). Let m i and m j be two generic BBAs in the TBM with weight functions w i and w j respectively. Their combination using the cautious conjunctive rule is noted w i j = w i w j . It is defined as the following weight function:
Our data aggregation algorithm works with the weight function w, which is obtained from masses using commonality function q, derived from the initial set of BBAs. In Sections 3 and 4, we show how these functions are generated from an initial set of BBAs, and used to test the convergence of our algorithm.
Distributed data fusion
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Let us consider a network of agents described by an undirected graph G = {V, E(t)} where V = {v i : i = 1, .., N } is the set of nodes (agents) and
is the set of current edges, representing the point-to-point communication channel availability. We denote with t k the instant when the k -th communication on the network occurs. Furthermore, the following assumptions on the network 160 of agents are made.
1. The network can be described by a connected undirected graph.
2. Every node produces a local BBA expressed as a weight function called direct confidence. In the proposed framework, the interaction among the agents can be modeled 170 through a gossip algorithm [19] , which is defined as a triplet {S, R, e}, where the following holds:
1. S = {s 1 , ..., s n } is the set containing the local states s i ∈ R q of each agent i in the network s.t. s i (t) = (w i (t, γ 1 ), .., w i (t, γ q )) at time t with
2. R is the interaction rule based on the operator s.t. for any couple of agents (i, j) with e ij ∈ E(t), gives R :
:
3. e is the edge selection process that specifies which edge e ij ∈ E(t) is selected at time t.
A possible implementation of the algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1: Gossip Algorithm
while stop condition do
• Select and edge eij ∈ E(t) according to e ;
• Update the state of the selected agents according to R:
end It is worth noting that, our algorithm does not require agents to have a unique identifier, that is we do not require the agents to know the identity of the neighbors they are exchanging information with. Note that, this assumption is not cosmetic as security and confidentiality represent typical requirements for interdependent critical infrastructures [21] . So far, we have introduced the 185 gossip algorithm based on the R interaction rule.
Furthermore, we point out that in principle this update rule is similar to the min-consensus algorithm described in [20] . Briefly, the major difference is related to the fact that in our framework we consider a gossip scheme and thus interactions are asynchronous while in [20] a consensus scheme is considered and thus the interactions are synchronous.
In the following, it will be shown that, if the agents apply the gossip algorithm described previously, over a dynamic network topology where link failures may occur due to natural disasters, cyber attacks or physical-security threats, they will eventually converge toward a common BBA expressed as the weight (1) and (3).
If e is such that ∀ t ∃ ∆t ∈ R such that G(t, t + ∆ t) is connected, then there exists a time t =t s.t. ∀ t >t, ∀ γ a ∈ 2 Ω \ Ω, the following holds:
that is, each agent i converges toward the same weight function.
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Proof. In order to prove the convergence of the proposed algorithm towards a steady-state, let us consider a generic network topology where |V | = N representing the number of agents, that is critical infrastructures in our case.
Let us consider the network at different time intervals
each time interval ∆t i , the agents interact using the interaction rule R to form a connected graph.
In particular, for any pair v i and v j such that (v i , v j ) ∈ E(t) at time t, the cautious rule of combination is applied so that the two agents agree on the minimum of the weight function set values i.e.:
with z = |2 Ω \ Ω| as defined in (5).
With no lack of generality, let us consider γ a and assume that ∃ an agent v q
all the w(t, γ a ) with γ a ∈ 2 Ω \ Ω are compared among two agents to find the minimum. For the sake of simplicity, we now focus our reasoning on a generic w(t, γ a ). Clearly the reasoning holds for any w(t, γ a ).
Let us consider, for each time interval ∆t k , such that the graph
is connected, a particular edge selection policy that updates only one agent to 220 w(t k , γ a ). In addition, let us consider a partition of P = {U, W } of V with
where U contains the set agents that have reached the w(t k , γ a ) and W = V \ U the set of the remaining agents.
The worst case scenario for the edge selection policy e, in terms of number of interactions required to update only the state of one agent, verifies when 225 the connection between two agents v u ∈ U and v w ∈ W , for which e uv = (v u , v w ) ∈ E (t k , t k +∆t k ), occurs as last interaction and the graph
Let us now consider the worst case topology for a network with N agents, that is the topology for which the larger numbers of updates is required to reach 
At this point, all the agents v i for i = 1..N will have reached the same state that ∀ t ∃ ∆t ∈ N, so that the G(t, t + ∆ t) is connected. If exists a time M ∈ N : ∆ t < M ∀ t, then the convergence is reached by any agent at most Proof. The Proof follows directly from 1. In particular, we recall that, in the worst case scenario for the topology, the network exhibits the largest diameter
where all the nodes are updated. Assuming that an upper bound M is available to the time required for the network to be connected within each time interval
, the time required to update one agent is t i = M . By iterating the same reasoning, the process takes t = d · M to update all agents. Therefore, the 265 overall time required to the algorithm to converge in the worst case scenario for the topology is linear w.r.t the diameter of the network topology G. represents the weight function set value w i (t i , γa) of a generic set γa ∈ 2 Ω \ Ω, associated to agent i.
An illustrative example
Let us consider an example taken from Denoeux [13] to show the steps 270 performed by Algorithm 1. We consider a connected topology of N = 2 agents (i, j) with m 1 (0, γ a ) and m 2 (0, γ a ) with γ a ∈ 2 Ω as reported in Table 1 with Ω = {a, b, c}. For each agent, at time t = 0, the algorithm calculates the direct confidence in two steps: (i) the commonality function q i (0, γ a ) = q i (γ a ) is calculated using (1) from the BBA m i (0, γ a ) and (ii) the relative weight function 275 w i (0, γ a ) = w i (γ a ) with γ a ∈ 2 Ω \Ω is computed using (3) from q i (γ a ) as follows:
s.t. the the state of the two agents is given by s i (0) = (w i ({∅}), .., w i ({bc})).
By applying the interaction rule R, the two agents converge to s(t) as defined in (5) at time t = 1.
At time t = 1, in order to obtain the convergent BBA from the s(t), the 280 algorithm solves the system of |2 Ω | − 1 = 7 polynomial equations obtained from 
Considering that q({Ω}) = 1 and that m({Ω}) = 1 − γa∈2 Ω \Ω m(γ a ),the resulting system is given by 7 polynomial equations with 7 unknowns m(γ a )
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with γ a ∈ 2 Ω \ Ω. Table 1 reports the solution of this system given by the BBA m(γ a ) obtained from weight function w(γ a ).
Case study
As a case study, we consider a scenario of a set of assets, also known as Critical Infrastructures (CI), that are essential for the functioning of a society 290 and economy. The occurrence of specific conditions on such CI, are monitored by a set of n agents. Usually, CI (e.g., power grids, Telecommunication networks, Gas pipeline networks) exhibit various kinds of dependencies (e.g., cyber), which, may lead to cascading failures, i.e., failures that originates in one system and may produce disruptions in other systems.
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We consider a set of systems that are geographically distributed, and can generically represent the infrastructures of a city district. Each infrastructure is monitored by a SCADA system, that allows the correct functioning including:
• the SCADA Management system (e.g., HMI, Historian) running in a SCADA control centre to monitor and control the field equipment;
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• a communication network that allows the exchange of messages between the field devices and the SCADA management system. The communication network may be proprietary or public and based on specific SCADA protocols (e.g., Modbus, Modbus over TCP);
• the field devices (i.e., sensors, PLC, RTU, IED) that acquire the physical 305 quantities of the system and implement control actions.
Although critical infrastructures exhibit different kinds of dependencies, usually, they do not share any information. In our scenario, we suppose, on the contrary, that each infrastructure is able to produce information regarding a possible cause of fault. This information, is produced by the monitoring agents 310 of all infrastructures, deployed on the field devices, to detect the most credible cause of fault or threat, and exchanged among the agents to produce the same knowledge. The information sharing may be also realized in real scenarios by implementing specific policies among infrastructures.
In our scenario, the information to be shared among the infrastructures is • monitoring agents acquiring measurements from the field devices. Such agents can raise specific alarm conditions to detect: (i) physical events (e.g., the fault of a valve in water supply system); (ii) cyber events (e.g., an intrusion on a RTU of power distribution system), and (iii) physical-320 security events (i.e., the access of unauthorized personnel in the area of system under control, which may sabotage a system).
• aggregation agents impersonating the SCADA Management system. They cannot correlate events from the field devices, but act as aggregation nodes only by collecting the information of the neighbor monitoring Figure 4 ). Based on our assumptions on aggregation agents, the latter, act as aggregation nodes only (i.e., their direct confidence depends only on the neighbor nodes).
EVENTS DETECTION
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In Figure 3 , we describe three main phases relative to the agents interaction:
• Events detection: the monitoring agents use measurement coming from the sensors to produce a BBA from specific events. For instance, agents acquiring measurements from seismic sensors or pluviometers, can provide an early warning against possible faults in the systems monitored, which, may be induced by earthquakes and floods.
• Events aggregation: monitoring and aggregation agents fuse their in-formation based on the gossip algorithm described in Section 2.
• Convergence: monitoring and aggregation agents reach convergence in a finite time step, thus providing the most credible cause(s) of fault.
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It is worth noting that, based on Lemmas 1 and 2, the convergence of the algorithm is ensured for any edge selection policy e that allows to obtain a connected graph in finite time. The latter property is particularly important in a disaster environment, such as the scenario described, where the communication path among two nodes may be unavailable over time, due to different reasons The presented approach is distributed as it can be implemented in a network without a central node. This differs w.r.t. a centralized approach, that, instead, is typical in traditional SCADA system architectures. In particular, in a cen-375 tralized approach, the SCADA management system would be able to gather and correlate events and security information coming from the field equipment, to reveal malicious activities that are perpetrated in a distributed manner. In other words, the presence of a centralized node would be able to produce more accurate information about the state of the monitored system. Our approach 380 is distributed, because, the innovative SCADA management system nodes, impersonated by aggregation agents, act as neutral nodes with an initial BBA s.t. Indeed, a distributed approach may present several advantages compared to 385 a centralized one when considering a disaster scenario. One advantage is concerned with more reliability: a distributed approach, being based on a plethora of monitoring agents, relies on many agents instead of only one node, which, may be out of service or isolated following an earthquake. In addition, during an emergency time, it may be preferable to provide information timely, even if 390 less informative, instead of waiting for more accurate information, that can be given by a centralized approach.
Problem formulation
We consider n = 4 interdependent critical infrastructures, that can be affected by failures or threats. Each infrastructure is able to produce one or more 395 BBAs from physical, cyber and physical-security events detected by monitoring Table 2 presents the monitoring agents considered for each infrastructure.
In the following, we present practical methods that can be implemented by the agents, to generate the relative BBA from sensor measurements, in the considered scenario. Then, we show how the algorithm converges, in a limited time, considering an initial set of BBAs. threat since the SCADA control room door could be opened by a different employee when authorized personnel entered the room. However, when modeling the BBA of agent 1, we consider the possibility that, an intruder, with access to the SCADA control room, may be facilitated to perform a cyber attack (see Table 3 ).
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Agents v 2 periodically monitors the water flow rates and the water levels, With this in mind, we modeled the BBA associated to agent v 2 , by combining 445 the verification/violation of the two security conditions (see Table 4 ).
Power distribution station
Earthquakes and hurricanes are known to produce a devastating effect on power distribution systems [25] . In general, earthquakes, could damage all types of power system equipment causing interruptions that may last some days. To 
Based on these relations, and the I M CS and I v values calculated, agent 3, can calculate the factor of damage f d ( Figure 5 ) and estimate the credibility of a physical fault affecting the power distribution station. Table 5 A m 3 (A) an hot-spot analysis was conducted over a 2-years period for a residential ur- shows an high correlation between the disconnections and the rain precipitations abundance. This result suggests that the precipitation rain quantity may be a reliable predictor of the disconnections and provides a metric to implement the BBAs of agent v 4 . Table 6 presents different credibility levels of physical fault occurring in the considered substation, based on the daily quantity of rain 490 precipitation denoted by Q (mm). 
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Base Transceiver Station
Today, a large number of BTS antennae is installed in the cities, and they are often located on the roof of buildings. This makes such systems being vulnerable to earthquakes, since a damage on a building where a BTS is installed, 
Water supply network
Earthquakes are the most serious natural threat to a water supply network.
In particular, earthquakes can cause different damages to pipelines (e.g. lon-
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gitudinal and circumferential cracks, compression joint breaks) which can provide severe disruptions for water consumers (e.g., residents, hospitals, industrial plants). To detect the effects of seismic events on the water supply network, agent v 6 acquires PGA from the seismic sensor SS 3 installed in a pipeline that serves a residential area. From a structural point of view, we assume to monitor 515 a segmented pipeline i.e. a brittle iron pipeline with bell-and-spigot joints, that is generically used for water supply networks. To define the BBAs generated by A m 6 (A) P GA ≤ 0.2 0.2 < P GA ≤ 35 35 < P GA ≤ 50 35 < P GA ≤ 50 P GA > 50
, we considered the fragility curve for the specified pipeline, defined by Lanzano et al. [29] , and shown in Figure 7 . Table 7 shows the credibility values of a physical fault, that are proportional to the severity of the PGA detected 520 during an earthquake.
Security patrol
The security patrol impersonated by agent v 7 , can be based on the security vehicle prototype presented in [30] . This vehicle has specific equipment for detecting wireless threats based on a technique known as Wardriving. This 525 technique can be implemented by a vehicle that drives around a sensitive facility, to collect wireless network traffic, that, may be produced by intruders that are in proximity a specific site. These data are then analyzed to discover potential threats. When a threat is revealed, specific security procedures may be adopted.
Due to its specific capabilities, this vehicle can account for cyber and physical-530 security threats. However, defining a BBA policy for this agent, is applicationdependent as it requires a deep analysis of the environment monitored by the car and the wireless traffic data. Indeed, to quantify the credibility of cyber and physical-security threats in a BBA, several properties should be considered, including: (i) the signal strength of the emitter, and (ii) the number of packets 535 collected. Hence, the stronger the signal, the more likely the location of potential intruders will be accurate. Moreover, the more packets are collected, the more likely cyber attacks can be discovered. For our scenario, we suppose to have a security patrol, such as the one presented, that is able to issue, at each time step, cyber and physical-security threats in terms of a BBA. This information 540 is periodically communicated, via wireless connection, to the aggregation agent of a specific infrastructure.
Numerical example
In this Section, we present results of an algorithm execution, where we considered a specific set of BBAs and a random topology generated at each time 545 step. In order to prove the convergence of the algorithm, based on Lemma 1, the edge selection policy e, at each time step, generates a random connected graph, where the edges among the agents may, or may not, exist and the security patrol is connected to an aggregation agent that changes over time. This policy is compliant with our assumptions of applying the algorithm in a disaster scenario 550 Table 8 where the communication network may undergo temporary or permanent disconnections. We consider, at time t = 0, the set of BBAs reported in Table 8 , relative to the network topology shown in Figure 4 . In particular, we assumed that the security patrol provides the same alarm condition over time when it monitors the water supply network, given by agent m 7 in Table 8 , whereas it 555 provides no information, i.e., m(Ω) = 1, when it monitors other infrastructures.
Last row of Table 8 , shows the convergent BBA m(γ a ) at time t = 106, that is obtained from the weight function w(γ a ) as described in Section 3.1. The BBA m(γ a ) exhibits as highest credible value the occurrence of a physical fault affecting the considered infrastructures. It is worth noting that the same con-560 vergent BBA can be obtained through a centralized approach where all BBAs, expressed as weight functions, are aggregated using the cautious operator.
Conclusions
In this work, a distributed algorithm for data aggregation in the Transferable
Belief Model, has been proposed. We proved the convergence of the algorithm 565 for any connected network topology in finite time, and using the cautious rule of combination as the aggregation rule among agents. The algorithm was applied to a realistic scenario of critical infrastructures, which exhibit functional dependencies. Each infrastructure is equipped with specific agents, which are able to arise early warnings when specific conditions are verified. To this regard,
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we proposed practical methods to build the BBA of each agent, depending on the occurrence of possible physical, cyber, and physical-security events. The exchange of information among the infrastructures, based on the presented algorithm, can be valuable for decision makers during emergency times, to understand the most credible causes of infrastructure services degradation, and thus,
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to take immediate countermeasures. Future work will be mainly focused on the extension of the presented algorithm to consider the nature of the specific dependency relations among the infrastructures, thus providing a risk level that can be specific for each system. Furthermore, we will integrate additional agents to detect a broader range of events affecting infrastructures (e.g., lightnings, 580 landslides).
